



Historische context (I)

- AIDS epidemie begin omslag denken over infectieziekten
- Notie van “emerging and re-emerging” infectieziekten in de jaren negentig van de vorige eeuw
- Deze eeuw toenemende angst voor grootschalige uitbraken




Global summary of the HIV and AIDS epidemic, December 2005

Number of people living with HIV in 2005	Total	40.3 million (36.7 – 45.3 million)
	Adults	38.0 million (34.5 – 42.6 million)
	Women	17.5 million (16.2 – 19.3 million)
	Children under 15 years	2.3 million (2.1 – 2.8 million)
People newly infected with HIV in 2005	Total	4.9 million (4.3 – 6.6 million)
	Adults	4.2 million (3.6 – 5.8 million)
	Children under 15 years	700 000 (630 000 – 820 000)
AIDS deaths in 2005	Total	3.1 million (2.8 – 3.6 million)
	Adults	2.6 million (2.3 – 2.9 million)
	Children under 15 years	570 000 (510 000 – 670 000)



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SARS airports and airlines



1. Pre-departure screening

2. Isolation of suspected SARS cases aboard flights

3. Disembarkation



Historische context (II)

- Vanaf 1989 landelijk netwerk van GGD'en vanwege Wet Collectieve Preventie Volksgezondheid
- Ontwikkeling protocollen, draaiboeken en kwaliteitsprofiel infectieziektebestrijding
- Oprichting Landelijke Coördinatiestructuur Infectieziekten (LCI) (1994)
- Oprichting Centrum Infectieziektebestrijding (2004)
- Toenemende betrokkenheid van GHOR bureaus en Regionaal Geneeskundig Functionarissen bij epidemie bestrijding




Positie inspectie

- Tot 2004 drie kerntaken:
 - *Handhaving wetgeving*
 - *Toezicht kwaliteit infectieziektebestrijding (afzonderlijke instellingen, keten)*
 - *Toezicht staat infectieziekten*
- Opdrachtgever RIVM
- Na oprichting Cib beperkt de inspectie zich tot handhaving wetgeving en toezicht kwaliteit



Oordeel infectieziekten





Twee rapporten

- Voorbereiding op grote epidemieën
 - *Onderdeel SGZ*
- Toetsing regionale implementatie draaiboeken influenza
 - *Aviaire influenza*
 - *Incidentele introductie nieuw humaan influenzavirus*
 - *Bestrijding influenza pandemie*



Vorbereiding op grote epidemieën

- Actueel vanwege SARS, influenza en dreiging bioterrorisme
- Vorbereiding is gecompliceerd en kost tijd
- Kernpunt is opschaling reguliere bestrijding
- Rapport is een momentopname:
Hoe ver zijn we gevorderd?



Conclusies

- Er is al veel gebeurd:
 - *Er zijn draaiboeken opgesteld en grotendeels geïmplementeerd*
 - *Oprichting Centrum Infectieziektebestrijding*
 - *Aanschaf vaccins en antivirale middelen*
- Verder werken aan:
 - *Signalering*
 - *Opschaling*
 - *Kwaliteit en verdere implementatie draaiboeken*



Signalering

- Nationaal en internationaal
- Toenemend belang afstemming op EU-niveau
 - *Early Warning and Response System*
- International Health Regulations (WHO)
 - *Meldingplicht van een “public health emergency of international concern”*
- Uitbreiding signalering in Nederland?
 - *Syndroom surveillance?*
 - *Andere systemen (bijv. monitoring ambulance ritten)?*



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- **Reporting Member Name** EWRS France Ministère de la Santé **Institution** Ministère de la Santé et des Solidarités - Direction Générale de la Santé **Event Information**
Posted on: 27/02/2006 at 18:55 **Message Content:** Adopted measures **Reporting Reason:** A3 Have epidemiologically-linked cases of the same disease been detected/reported recently in another country/ies? **Syndrome / Disease:** Influenza
Pathogen Influenza virus **Country of Occurrence** France **Date of onset/detection** 27/02/2006 **WHO Accessibility** This message is accessible to WHO
MESSAGE: EWRS 27/02/2006 : H5N1 outbreak in a turkey farm in France, Ain department
Institution: Ministère de la Santé et des Solidarités - Direction Générale de la Santé **DATE:** 27/02/2006

The National Reference Laboratory for Avian Influenza has identified on Saturday, February 25th on an industrial farm with 11.000 turkeys the same H5N1 virus subtype, as previously isolated on February 17th on a wild duck, in the same swamp area of The Dombes country, Ain department, about fifty kilometres north-east from Lyon. The same H5N1 strain (quite similar to the Tula H5N1 strain) has also been identified on several wild ducks and swans in the same area.

The turkey in the industrial farm were inside, and there is a suspicion that the H5N1 virus has been brought in through contaminated straw kept in an open shed.

According to WHO phases and the national influenza pandemic plan (file attached), France is itself in phase 2B: epizootic outbreak in France caused by a highly pathogenic virus, without human cases.

The two ministries involved are implementing the measures foreseen in the case of presence of an avian influenza outbreak with a highly pathogenic virus and presenting a proven risk of human transmission during an epizootic in France or in neighbouring areas. That means :

For veterinary risk management : according to the biosafety measures recommended by EU, and in agreement with the local veterinary and government authorities, the Ministry of Agriculture has implemented the main following measures :

- declaration of confirmed infection ;
- epidemiological investigation to determine how the farm has been infected, which are the other local or regional industries involved in contact with this infected farm, and to identify products and foodstuffs likely to be contaminated, in order to detain them;
- measures concerning the farm where poultry is infected :
 - . in this case of highly pathogenic virus identified, immediate slaughtering of the poultry on the spot;
 - . destruction of the corpses and of all products that cannot be disinfected;
 - . cleaning and disinfection of the facilities;
- measures around the affected farm: setting up of a protection area (minimum radius of 3 km) and of a controlled area (minimum radius of 10 km), with checking and restricting movements (of persons, other animals, etc.) and disinfecting vehicles leaving the farm;

For the public health risk management, the following measures have been implemented :

- Five people directly exposed to infected turkeys without protection received antiviral chemoprophylaxis : a veterinary, a couple of farmers, the father of one of the farmers and an electrician ;
- Free, voluntary vaccination with seasonal influenza vaccine is being considered for 1.150 professional people exposed living in the restriction area, with explanations ;
- Information for partners of the health system and people living within the perimeters of veterinary protection and surveillance ;
- Information provided by the Ministry of health establishments and regulation emergency call-centers (SAMU-centres 15), concerning the new epidemiological situation and case definition for a suspected human case.

Nota bene : seasonal influenza has started in France and has now risen to epidemic level in most of the country, with 34% of B Victoria strain not included in vaccine.

The public has been informed on the behaviour to adopt towards dead birds.

The French Ministries of Agriculture and Health, the national institute for public health surveillance ("Institut de veille sanitaire"), are monitoring the situation in France very closely.

- **Attachments** File: [Plan version anglaise.pdf](#) (840.53515625 kb)
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Opschaling

- Bron- en contactopsporing
- Medisch toezicht en afzondering
- Diagnostiek
- Profylactische behandeling
- Medische zorg (en isolatie)
- Voorlichting en communicatie met beroepsgroepen



Kwaliteitseisen draaiboeken

- Toetsing door de Gezondheidsraad
 - ✓ *Wetenschappelijke borging*
- Toetsing door Landelijk Overleg Infectieziekten
 - ✓ *Borging uitvoerbaarheid in engere zin*
- Toetsing door Raad van RGF'en
 - ✓ *Borging uitvoerbaarheid in bredere zin*
- Toetsing aan buitenlandse voorbeelden
- Doorrekening aan de hand van mathematische modellen
- Implementatie
 - *Nationaal niveau*
 - *Regionaal niveau*
- Beoefenen en testen
- Actualisering



Voldoen de draaiboeken aan de kwaliteitseisen?

- Toetsing vindt te weinig plaats
- Geen systematische analyse van verschillen met buitenlandse draaiboeken
- Implementatie nog onvoldoende
- Oefen- en testbeleid nog in kinderschoenen
- Actualisering niet geborgd.



Is Nederland voldoende voorbereid?

- Inspectie heeft getoetst aan de criteria van de Raad van RGF'en
- Mei 2005: *50% van de regio's voldoende*
November 2005: *75% voldoende*
Maart 2006: *96% voldoende*
- Maar.....
 - *Papier is geduldig*
 - *Operationele kwaliteit onzeker*
 - *Aantal (belangrijke) zaken nog niet geregeld*



Zorgpunten

- Beschikbaarheid mondneusmaskers
- Distributie en toediening antivirale middelen
- Continuïteit zorg 1e lijn
- Continuïteit zorg 2e lijn



Is er wel een probleem?

- Twee vorige pandemieën zijn betrekkelijk probleemloos verlopen
- Omstandigheden wezenlijk anders dan in 1918
- Beschikbaarheid antibiotica en antivirale middelen
- Modelberekeningen
 - ✓ *Geen overbelasting 1e en 2e lijn*